Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Maths as a Science of Patterns', 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong' and 'Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge''

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik]
Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik]
There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik]
Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik]
Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]