62 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |