12 ideas
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |