12 ideas
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
| 14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |