Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth'' and 'Occasions of Identity'

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10 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
10845 To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10847 Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
10846 Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]