17 ideas
| 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
| 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
| 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
| 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
| 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
| 7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
| 7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
| 7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
| 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
| 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |