8 ideas
| 8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
| 8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |