12 ideas
| 12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
| 12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
| 12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |