15 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |