10 ideas
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |