Combining Texts

All the ideas for ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?', 'Individuation' and 'Causation'

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9 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

8502	Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals

8503	The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

8501	Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism

8967	Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

8965	Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation

8968	If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

8406	Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind

8966	Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8407	A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]