Combining Texts

All the ideas for ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?', 'Individuation' and 'works'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]