Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'The Intentionality of Sensation' and 'The Varieties of Reference'

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9 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7439 The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]