7 ideas
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
13097 | Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |