Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Being and Nothingness' and 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz'

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26 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22227 For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
20743 Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
6151 Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6164 Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7074 Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
6687 Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22228 Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22233 Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
20755 Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
20760 Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
22231 We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]