Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Relations' and 'Mental Content'

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22 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21339 We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil]
21349 Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil]
21340 Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21348 In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil]
21351 Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil]
21344 If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]