36 ideas
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
8623 | Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege] |
13907 | If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon] |
6297 | Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik] |
9603 | An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR] |
9894 | A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid] |
8738 | Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro] |
22278 | Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid] |
8673 | Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend] |
10250 | Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid] |
10302 | Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays] |
14157 | Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid] |
1600 | Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |