Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism' and 'Quaestiones de Potentia Dei'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]