12 ideas
8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |