15 ideas
15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |