19 ideas
17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |