Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

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22 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo]
Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo]
'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo]
'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin]
Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]