Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic'' and 'Negation'

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32 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
18781 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
18787 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
18793 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
18784 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
8195 Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18782 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
18783 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18792 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
18785 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
8194 Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8190 Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
18788 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
8198 A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
8192 I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
8199 The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
5163 Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
5167 The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
8193 Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
8189 Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
8191 The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
5168 Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
8197 Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
8196 The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]