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All the ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' and 'Real Essentialism'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]