Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Justification of Deduction', 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences' and 'Categories'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]