Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'Proslogion' and 'Infinitism solution to regress problem'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8833 Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
8195 Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
8194 Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8190 Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
8198 A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
8192 I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
8199 The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8834 Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8838 If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8839 Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8193 Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
8189 Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
8191 The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
8197 Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
8196 The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
21241 Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
21243 An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
21244 Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
21242 If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
1421 A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
21245 The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
21246 Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
21247 Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
1420 Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]