35 ideas
7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |