7 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |