20 ideas
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |