76 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |