45 ideas
24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |