Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic', 'Davidson on himself' and 'On Freedom'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18073 Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
19057 Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
5040 Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
13159 Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
5039 If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19055 Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
19056 If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19054 Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
5041 God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz]