Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic', 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' and 'Mathematical Explanation'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
6979 Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
6980 Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
6983 Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
14707 Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
7005 Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
6994 Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18073 Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
19057 Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
6984 Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
6978 Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
6993 Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
13230 Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
6987 We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
6988 Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
6975 Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
6982 Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
6991 We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13229 Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
13231 Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6976 In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
6986 Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6992 If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
6996 Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6977 Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
6990 Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
6985 Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19055 Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
19056 If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19054 Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
6995 Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
6989 I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
6998 Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
6997 Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
7000 Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
6999 It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]