Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic', 'Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III)' and 'A Study of Concepts'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18073 Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
19057 Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22040 Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
22039 Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19055 Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
19056 If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19054 Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]