Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Justification of Deduction', 'Epistemic Justification' and 'The Fragmentation of Reason'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]