42 ideas
| 17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
| 10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
| 10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
| 10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
| 10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
| 10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
| 10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
| 17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
| 10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
| 17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
| 17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
| 10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
| 17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
| 17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
| 10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
| 17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
| 17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
| 17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
| 17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
| 10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
| 10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
| 10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
| 17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |