73 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |