52 ideas
| 9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
| 9724 | Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton] |
| 9707 | 'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton] |
| 9705 | 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton] |
| 9704 | 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton] |
| 9703 | 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton] |
| 9710 | We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton] |
| 9699 | The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton] |
| 9700 | Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton] |
| 9712 | A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton] |
| 9713 | A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton] |
| 9701 | A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton] |
| 9702 | A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton] |
| 9708 | A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton] |
| 9709 | A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton] |
| 9711 | A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton] |
| 9706 | A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton] |
| 9714 | A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton] |
| 9717 | A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton] |
| 9716 | We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton] |
| 9715 | An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton] |
| 9722 | Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton] |
| 9718 | Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
| 9721 | A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton] |
| 9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
| 9994 | A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton] |
| 9719 | A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton] |
| 9720 | A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton] |
| 9995 | Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton] |
| 9996 | Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton] |
| 9997 | For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
| 9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
| 9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
| 9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
| 9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
| 9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
| 9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
| 9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
| 9723 | Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |