Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic', 'Aristotle on Substance' and 'The Doctrine of Necessity Examined'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]