Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thought and Reality', 'Truth' and 'The Human Condition'

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53 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett]
The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett]