47 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |