18 ideas
15045 | The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |