34 ideas
6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |