Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)', 'Analyticity Reconsidered' and 'The Book of Chuang Tzu'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]