12 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |