Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference', 'Infinitism solution to regress problem' and 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]