112 ideas
| 22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
| 12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
| 12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
| 12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
| 12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
| 12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
| 12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
| 12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
| 12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
| 12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
| 12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
| 12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
| 12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
| 12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
| 12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
| 12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
| 12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
| 18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
| 12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
| 12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
| 12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
| 12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
| 22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
| 12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
| 12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
| 12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
| 12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
| 22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
| 12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
| 12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
| 12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
| 12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
| 12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
| 12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
| 12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
| 12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
| 12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
| 12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
| 12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
| 12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
| 22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
| 22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
| 22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
| 22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
| 22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
| 12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
| 12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
| 12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
| 12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
| 12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
| 12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
| 12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
| 12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
| 12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
| 12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
| 12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
| 12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
| 12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
| 12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
| 12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
| 12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
| 12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
| 12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
| 22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
| 22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
| 12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
| 22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
| 12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
| 12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
| 12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
| 12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
| 12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
| 22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
| 22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
| 12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
| 12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
| 22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
| 22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
| 22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
| 22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
| 22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
| 22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
| 22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
| 22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
| 22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
| 22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
| 22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
| 22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
| 22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
| 22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
| 22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
| 22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
| 22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |