Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege philosophy of mathematics', 'Virtue Ethics: an Introduction' and 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity'

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45 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett]
Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett]
It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett]
'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett]
An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait]
We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett]