31 ideas
| 3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
| 3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
| 3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
| 3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
| 3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
| 3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
| 3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
| 3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
| 3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |