38 ideas
| 8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
| 8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
| 8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
| 8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
| 8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
| 8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
| 8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
| 8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
| 8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
| 8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
| 8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
| 8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |